A shuffle is a permutation and re-encryption of a set of ciphertexts. Shuffles are for instance used in mix-nets for anonymous broadcast and voting. One way to make a shuffle verifiable is to give a zeroknowledge proof of correctness. All currently known practical zero-knowledge proofs for correctness of a shuffle rely on interaction. We give the first efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proof for correctness of a shuffle.
Introduction
A shuffle is a permutation and re-encryption of a set of ciphertexts. Shuffles are used for instance in mix-nets [Cha81] , which in turn are used in protocols for anonymous broadcast and electronic voting. In a typical construction of a mix-net, the users encrypt messages that they want to publish anonymously. They send the encrypted messages to a set of mix-net servers that will anonymize the messages. The first server permutes and re-encrypts the incoming set of messages, i.e., it carries out a shuffle. The next server takes the output from the first server and shuffles these ciphertexts. The protocol continues like this until all servers have permuted and re-encrypted the ciphertexts. After the mixing is complete, the mix-servers may now perform a threshold decryption operation to get out the permuted set of messages. The idea is that if just one mix-server is honest, the messages will be randomly permuted and because of the re-encryption step nobody will know the permutation. The messages therefore appear in random order and cannot be traced back to the senders.
The mix-net protocol we just described is not secure if one of the mix-servers is dishonest. A dishonest mix-server could for instance discard some of the ciphertexts and inject new ciphertexts of its own choosing. It is therefore desirable to make the shuffle verifiable. An obvious way to make the mix-net verifiable is to ask each mix-server to provide a zero-knowledge proof of its shuffle being correct. The zero-knowledge proof guarantees that the shuffle is correct, yet reveals nothing about the permutation or the re-encryption and therefore preserves the privacy of the mix-net.
Much research has already been done on making shuffles verifiable by providing interactive proofs of correctness [SK95, Abe99, AH01, Nef01, FS01, Gro03, NSNK04, NSNK05, Fur05, Wik05, GL07] . The proofs in these papers are all interactive and rely on the verifier choosing random challenges. Using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, where the verifier's challenges are computed through the use of a cryptographic hashfunction, it is possible to make these proofs non-interactive. As a heuristic argument for the security of these non-interactive proofs, one can prove them secure in the random oracle model [BR93] , where the cryptographic hash-function is viewed as a random oracle that outputs a random string. However, Goldwasser and Our contribution. We offer the first non-interactive zero-knowledge argument for correctness of a shuffle. The NIZK argument is in the common reference string model and has perfect zero-knowledge. The security proof of our scheme does not rely on the random oracle model. Instead we make use of recently developed techniques for making non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proofs for bilinear groups by Groth and Sahai [GS07] , which draws on earlier work by Groth, Ostrovsky and Sahai [GOS06b, GOS06a, Gro06] .
The NIZK argument we suggest is for the correctness of a shuffle of BBS ciphertexts. This cryptosystem, suggested by Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [BBS04] , has ciphertexts that consist of 3 group elements for each group element that they encrypt. We consider statements consisting of n input ciphertexts and n output ciphertexts and the claim that the output ciphertexts are a shuffle of the input ciphertexts. Our NIZK arguments consist of 15n group elements, which is reasonable in comparison with the statement size, which is 6n group elements.
Preliminaries and Notation

Bilinear Groups
In this paper, we work over prime order bilinear groups. In other words, we assume there is probabilistic polynomial time algorithm G that takes a security parameter k as input and outputs (p, G, G T , e, g), where:
1. p is a prime 2. G and G T are cyclic groups of order p 3. g is a random generator of G 4. e : G × G → G T is a map with the following properties
• Bilinearity: e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g) ab for all a, b ∈ Z p
• Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) generates G T 5. Group operations and the bilinear map are efficiently computable and group membership is efficiently decidable.
We will for notational simplicity assume that group membership always is checked when appropriate without writing this explicitly.
BBS Encryption
The BBS cryptosystem was introduced by Boneh, Boyen and Shacham [BBS04] . We work in a bilinear group (p, G, G T , e, g). The public key is of the form (f = g x , h = g y ). The secret key is (x, y) ∈ (Z * p ) 2 . To encrypt m ∈ G, we choose random s, t ∈ Z p and let the ciphertext be
To decrypt a ciphertext (u, v, w) ∈ G 3 , we compute
The BBS cryptosystem is semantically secure under chosen plaintext attack if the Decisional Linear Problem is hard in the bilinear group. We refer to Section 3.1 for a formal definition of this assumption.
Shuffling BBS Ciphertexts
The BBS cryptosystem is homomorphic in the sense that entrywise multiplication of two ciphertexts yields an encryption of the product of the plaintexts. We have:
It is easy to make a random shuffle of BBS ciphertexts. Given n input ciphertexts, we permute them randomly and then re-encrypt them by multiplying random encryptions of 1. Multiplication with encryptions of 1 preserves the plaintexts by the homomorphic property, but the plaintexts now appear in permuted order. If the Decisional Linear Assumption holds, the BBS cryptosystem is semantically secure and thus the permutation is hidden. For notational purposes, we will let
that there exists some permutation π ∈ S n and randomizers {(S i , T i )} so:
Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments
We will construct non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) arguments for correctness of a shuffle of n BBS ciphertexts. Informally, such an argument will demonstrate that the shuffle is correct, but will not reveal anything else, in particular the permutation will remain secret. We will now define NIZK arguments. Let R be an efficiently decidable ternary relation. For triplets (gk, x, w) ∈ R we call x the statement and w the witness. Given some setup gk we let L be the setup-dependent language consisting of statements in R. For a relation that ignores gk this is of course the standard definition of an NP-language. Further, let R co be another ternary relation containing triplets of the form (gk, x, w co ).
A NIZK argument for R with R co -soundness consists of six probabilistic polynomial time algorithms: a setup algorithm G, a CRS generation algorithm K, a prover P , a verifier V and simulators (S 1 , S 2 ). The setup algorithm G outputs some initial information gk. The CRS generation algorithm produces a common reference string σ corresponding to the setup. The prover takes as input (gk, σ, x, w) and produces a proof ψ. The verifier takes as input (gk, σ, x, ψ) and outputs 1 if the proof is acceptable and 0 if the proof is rejected. The simulator S 1 takes as input gk and outputs a simulated common reference string σ as well as a simulation trapdoor τ . S 2 takes as input gk, σ, τ, x and simulates a proof ψ.
Definition 2. We call (G, K, P, V, S 1 , S 2 ) a NIZK argument for R with R co -soundness if for all non-uniform adversaries A we have completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge as described below.
Perfect completeness:
Computational R co -soundness:
Perfect zero-knowledge:
We remark that if R ignores gk and if R co ignores gk, w co and contains all x / ∈ L, then the definition given above corresponds to the standard definition of perfect NIZK arguments for the NP-language specified by R. However, Abe and Fehr [AF07] have shown that only languages in P/poly can have direct black-box NIZK arguments with perfect zero-knowledge. In this paper, we will therefore focus on polynomial time decidable relations R co containing only x / ∈ L. Computational R co -soundness can then be interpreted as saying that it is infeasible for the adversary to prove x ∈ L if it knows x ∈ L co . The notion of co-soundness in NIZK arguments for NP-languages was introduced in the full paper of [GOS06b, GOS06a] .
In our paper, the setup algorithm will be G that outputs a description of a bilinear group. The relation R will consist of statements that contain a public key for the BBS cryptosystem using the bilinear group and a shuffle of n ciphertexts. The witness will be the permutation used in the shuffle as well as the randomness used for re-randomizing the ciphertexts. In other words:
The relation R co will consist of non-shuffles. The witness will be the decryption key, which makes it easy to decrypt and check that there is no permutation matching the input plaintexts with the output plaintexts.
.
We remark that NIZK arguments for correctness of a shuffle are usually deployed in a context where such a decryption key can be found. It is for instance common in mix-nets that the mix-servers have a threshold secret sharing of the decryption key for the cryptosystem used in the shuffle.
Non-interactive Witness-Indistinguishable Proofs for Bilinear Groups
We will employ the non-interactive proof techniques of Groth and Sahai [GS07] . They allow a prover to give short proofs that there exist group elements which satisfy a list of so-called pairing product equations. With their techniques, one can prove that there exists x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ G and φ 1 , . . . , φ n ∈ Z p such that they simultaneously satisfy a set of pairing product equations, for instance
One instantiation of their scheme works over bilinear groups where the Decisional Linear Assumption holds.
Their scheme has the following properties. It has a key generation algorithm that outputs a common reference string consisting of 8 group elements. These 8 group elements specify the public key to two commitment schemes, one for group elements in G, and one for exponents in Z p . In their proof, the prover commits to the witness by committing to the group elements x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ G and the exponents φ 1 , . . . , φ n ∈ Z p . After that the prover makes non-interactive proofs that the committed elements satisfy all the pairing product equations.
There are two ways of setting up the commitment schemes. One can choose the common reference string such that both commitment schemes are perfectly binding, in which case the proof has perfect completeness and perfect soundness. With a perfect binding key, the commitments to group elements are BBS ciphertexts, so we also get perfect knowledge of these elements and can decrypt the commitments to learn x 1 , . . . , x n .
Another way to choose the common reference string is to have public keys for perfectly hiding commitment schemes. In this case, we can set up the commitment to the exponents φ 1 , . . . , φ n as a perfect trapdoor commitment scheme. We can create a commitment and two different openings to respectively 0 and 1 for instance. When we have perfectly hiding keys in the common reference string, the non-interactive proof has perfect completeness and perfect witness-indistinguishability. In other words, an adversary that sees a proof for a statement for which two or more witnesses exist, gets no information whatsoever as to whether one witness or the other was used in the non-interactive proof.
We
), when creating a perfectly binding common reference string with extraction key ξ extraction for the commitments to group elements in G. We write (σ hiding , τ trapdoor ) ← K hiding (p, G, G T , e, g) when creating a perfect hiding common reference string with trapdoor τ trapdoor for the commitments to exponents in Z p . Perfect binding common reference strings and perfect hiding common reference strings are computationally indistinguishable if the Decisional Linear Assumption holds for the bilinear group we are working over.
Assumptions
The security of our NIZK argument for correctness of a shuffle will be based on three assumptions: the Decisional Linear Assumption, the Permutation Pairing Assumption and the Simultaneous Pairing Assumption. The BBS cryptosystem and the non-interactive proofs of Groth and Sahai rely on the Decisional Linear Assumption. The other two assumptions are needed for the NIZK argument for correctness of a shuffle. We will now formally define these assumptions and for the two new assumptions give heuristic reasons for believing them in form of demonstrating that they hold in the generic group model.
Decisional Linear Assumption
We first recap the Decisional Linear Assumption introduced in [BBS04] . The problem is as follows: Given gk = (p, G, G T , e, g) and given f, h, g, f s , h t , g z ∈ G, decide if z = s + t.
Definition 3. We define hardness of the Decisional Linear Problem formally, by saying that the Decisional Linear Assumption holds for G if for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries A we have:
Pr gk := (p, G, G T , e, g) ← G(1 k ) ; f, h R ← G ; s, t R ← Z p : A(gk, f, h, f s , h t , g s+t ) = 1 ≈ Pr gk := (p, G, G T , e, g) ← G(1 k ) ; f, h R ← G ; s, t, z R ← Z p : A(gk, f, h, f s , h t , g z ) = 1 .
Permutation Pairing Assumption
The Permutation Pairing Problem is: Given (p, G, G T , e, g) and g 1 := g x 1 , . . . , g n := g xn , γ 1 := g x 2 1 , . . . , γ n := g x 2 n for random x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ Z p find elements a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b n ∈ G such that the following holds:
If {a i } is a permutation of {g i }, then by the third equation {b i } is {γ i } permuted in the same way.
Observe that permutations trivially satisfy the first three conditions and not the fourth, but one could imagine some particular choice of the {a i } and {b i } would satisfy all four conditions. The Permutation Pairing Assumption holds if finding such a clever choice is computationally infeasible.
Definition 4. The Permutation Pairing Assumption holds if for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries
A we have:
Simultaneous Pairing Assumption
The Simultaneous Pairing Problem is: Given (p, G, G T , e, g) and g 1 := g x 1 , . . . , g n := g xn , γ 1 := g x 2 1 , . . . , γ n := g x 2 n for random x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ Z p find a non-trivial set of elements µ 1 , . . . , µ n ∈ G such that the following holds:
The intuition behind this problem is to find a set of (non-trivial) elements to simultaneously satisfy two pairing products of "linearly independent" sets of elements. The Simultaneous Pairing Assumption holds if it is computationally infeasible to find such {µ i }.
Definition 5. The Simultaneous Pairing Assumption holds if for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries
Our Assumptions in the Generic Group Model
We provide heuristic evidence that our assumptions hold by making the observation that they are implied by the generic group model [Sho97] . Under this model, elements of the groups G and G T are encoded as unique random strings, so that only equality may be tested between them. Oracles are provided for the group operation and the pairing operation. For example, if a, b ∈ G are encoded by [a], [b] respectively, then an adversary may apply the group operation to them by invoking the oracle on them, which will return an encoding [ab] . In this model, the Decisional Linear Assumption has been shown to hold [BBS04] . We will show our two other assumptions also hold in the generic group model. A fact we will be using repeatedly is as follows:
Fact 6. Given the generic encodings of random exponents x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ Z p , it is difficult to find a non-trivial relation between them (i.e. a polynomial which they are a root of) -an adversary making at mostueries to the operation oracles has only a O(q 2 /p) probability of success.
This fact follows as a consequence of the work by Shoup in [Sho97] . If in addition, the adversary gets encodings of x 2 1 , . . . , x 2 n , a modified proof will still show that the adversary only succeeds with negligible probability.
In our proofs below, we abuse notation for ease of reading and will write g and [g] interchangeably for the encoding of g. Proof. Let G be a generic bilinear group and let g ∈ G be a generator. Let x 1 , . . . , x n be chosen at random and set g 1 := g x 1 , . . . , g n := g xn , γ 1 := g x 2 1 , . . . , γ n := g x 2 n . An adversary takes the encodings of the {g i } and {γ i } as input and outputs encoded elements a 1 , . . . , a n , b 1 , . . . , b n ∈ G. We prove that the Permutation Pairing Assumption holds by showing it is infeasible to satisfy all of the conditions stated by the assumption. In particular, we will show that the first three conditions together imply the negation of the last condition. The first three conditions are:
We analyze this in the generic group model where each a i , b i can only be constructed via repeated calls to the group operation oracle on the elements g, g 1 , . . . , g n , γ 1 , . . . , γ n . This means the adversary computes:
The values {a ij }, {α ij }, {r i }, {b ij }, {β ij }, {s i } can be deduced from the calls to the group operation oracle.
For purposes of our analysis we may take logarithms base g (or e (g, g) ) to analyze each of the three conditions above. If
and viewed as a polynomial equation with indeterminate x i 's it must be trivial with overwhelming probability by Fact 6. Then, we see that we must have for all j, n i=1 a ij = 1 and
When viewed as a polynomial in x i , we see that we must have for all j,
Finally, if (∀i) e(a i , a i ) = e(g, b i ) then it must be the case that
Once again by viewing this as a polynomial equation, for all i we must have that a ij α ik = 0. Also a ij a ik = 0 when j = k, r 2 i = s i , b ij = 2a ij r i , β ij = a 2 ij + 2α ij r i . We now consider what the matrix A = (a ij ) must be. Each row A has at most one non-zero entry by the fact that a ij a ik = 0 when j = k. Also, each column must sum to 1 by n i=1 a ij = 1. These two facts combined implies A to have exactly one 1 in each column and each row, thus A is a permutation matrix. Since permutation matrices are invertible, from the equations
, we obtain that α ik = 0 and r i = 0. Therefore, the {a i } are a permutation of the {g i }.
Theorem 8. The Simultaneous Pairing Assumption holds under the generic group model.
Proof. Let G be a generic bilinear group and let g ∈ G be a generator. Let x 1 , . . . , x n be chosen at random and set g 1 := g x 1 , . . . , g n := g xn , γ 1 := g x 2 1 , . . . , γ n := g x 2 n . An adversary takes the encodings of {g i } and {γ i } as input and outputs encoded elements µ 1 , . . . , µ n ∈ G. We prove the Simultaneous Pairing Assumption holds by showing it is infeasible to satisfy all the conditions stated by the assumption. In particular, we will show that the first two conditions together imply the negation of the last condition. The first two conditions are:
We analyze this in the generic group model where each µ i can only be constructed via repeated calls to the group operation oracle. Each µ i will be constructed by the elements g, g 1 , . . . , g n , γ 1 , . . . , γ n :
with {a ij }, {α ij }, {r i } that can be deduced from the calls made to the group operation oracle. For purposes of our analysis we may take logarithms base e(g, g) to analyze each of the two conditions above. If n i=1 e(µ i , g i ) = 1 then it must be the case that (by looking at the discrete logarithms)
Viewing this as a polynomial in the x i , it must be trivial with overwhelming probability by Fact 6. We have that r i = 0, α ij = 0, and a ij + a ji = 0 for all i, j. Also we have
We similarly obtain that a ij = 0. Thus µ i are all trivial, and therefore it is computationally infeasible to find a non-trivial solution to the two equations.
NIZK Argument for Correctness of a Shuffle
We will now present a NIZK argument for correctness of a shuffle of BBS ciphertexts. We consider a set of n input ciphertexts {(u i , v i , w i )} and a set of output ciphertexts {(U i , V i , W i )} that may be a shuffle of the input ciphertexts. The common reference string will contain 2n elements {g i := g x i } and {γ i := g x 2 i } for random x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ Z p .
The first part of the NIZK argument consists of setting up pairing product equations that can only be satisfied if indeed we are dealing with a shuffle. The prover will use a set of variables {a i } and {b i } in these pairing product equations. She will set up a Permutation Pairing Problem over these variables to guarantee that {a i } and {b i } are permutations of respectively {g i } and {γ i }.
Let {m i } be the plaintexts of {(u i , v i , w i )} and {M i } be the plaintexts of {(U i , V i , W i )}. The prover also sets up equations such that
This is a Simultaneous Pairing Problem, and assuming the hardness of this problem we will have M π −1 (i) = m i for all i.
To give further intuition of the construction, consider a naïve protocol where the prover sends the permutation directly to the verifier. Denote a i := g π(i) and b i := γ π(i) . Consider the pairing product n i=1 e(a i , U i ) which can be re-written as
i . Similarly we can look at the equations for the v's and w's to obtain c v and c w . By construction, c w = c u c v . In addition, we may look at the equations by pairing the {b i } with the U i , V i , and W i . From this we obtain another three equations, and we define new elements
In total we have six equations:
e(γ i , w i ) Now suppose the prover sent π, c u , c v , c u , c v to the verifier. The verifier can check the six above equations himself for the verification step. The naive protocol described is complete by observation. We also have the following lemma:
Lemma 9. The naïve protocol is R co -sound.
Proof. The idea behind R co -soundness is to look at the underlying messages. If a dishonest prover were to convince a verifier with a non-shuffle as well as produce a witness (decryption key) (x, y), we can "decrypt" the equations checked by the verifier. Namely, if we let
then by applying the same algebraic manipulations in decryption to the equations, we obtain:
The formula simplifies to
e(g i , m i ), and similarly we obtain
Observe that the equations may be rearranged to be n i=1 e(µ i , g i ) = 1 and n i=1 e(µ i , γ i ) = 1 where µ i = m i /M π −1 (i) . Then by the Simultaneous Pairing Assumption, it would be infeasible for the prover to find non-trivial µ i , and thus we reach a contradiction.
The downfall of the naïve protocol is that it completely reveals the permutation. In the actual NIZK argument, we will instead argue that there exist such elements {a i } and {b i } that satisfy the equations above rather than revealing them directly. We accomplish this by making a GS proof for the set of pairing product equations given earlier. Our NIZK argument is described in Figure 1 . Proof. As we see in the protocol, the prover can generate the witness for the GS proof herself. Perfect completeness therefore follows from the perfect completeness of the GS proofs.
We will now prove that we have perfect zero-knowledge. The simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 ) will generate a transcript as described in Figure 2 . By construction, the common reference strings are generated in the same way. The only difference between a real proof and a simulated proof is the witness given to the GS proof. By the perfect witness-indistinguishability of the GS proof, real proofs and simulated proofs are perfectly indistinguishable.
It remains to prove that we have computational R co -soundness. The adversary is trying to output a public key (f, h) and a non-shuffle of n input ciphertexts and n output ciphertexts, a convincing NIZK argument ψ Setup: Generate a bilinear group gk := (p, G, G T , e, g) ← G(1 k ).
Common reference string: Generate a perfectly hiding common reference string (σ hiding , τ trapdoor ) ← K hiding (p, G, G T , e, g) to get perfectly witness-indistinguishable GS proofs. Pick random x 1 , . . . , x n ← Z p and compute ∀i : g i := g x i , γ i := g x 2 i . The common reference string is σ := (σ hiding , {g i }, {γ i }).
Shuffle statement: Public key (f, h) for the BBS cryptosystem. Input ciphertexts {(u i , v i , w i )} and output ciphertexts {(U i , V i , W i )}.
Prover's input: Permutation π ∈ S n and randomizers {(
Proof: The prover sets up the following pairing product equations:
e(γ i , w i )
A witness for satisfiability of the equations can be computed as:
and setting the remaining variables to 1. The prover generates a GS proof ψ that there exists an exponent φ ∈ Z p and group elements {a i },
w that satisfy the equations.
Verification:
The verifier accepts the non-interactive argument if and only if the GS proof ψ is valid. of it being a shuffle, and a decryption key (x, y). The relation R co is a polynomial time decidable relation that tests that (x, y) is the decryption key for (f, h) and that indeed we do have a non-shuffle. We will change the way we construct the common reference string for the NIZK argument. Instead of generating σ = (σ hiding , {g i }, {γ i }) as in the scheme, we return σ := (σ binding , {g i }, {γ i }) where (σ binding , ξ extraction ) ← K binding (p, G, G T , e, g). By the Decisional Linear Assumption, perfect binding and perfect hiding common reference strings for the GS proofs are computationally indistinguishable, so the adversary's success probability only changes negligibly.
The commitment with trivial randomness is now a perfectly binding commitment to the exponent φ = 1.
The GS proof is a perfect proof of knowledge of variables c u ,
w , {a i }, {b i } satisfying the equations, which can be extracted using ξ extraction . Since φ = 1, the equations demonstrate
Lemma 9 now gives us that there is negligible probability of c u , c v , c u , c v , {a i }, {b i } satisfying the equations and at the same time the input and output ciphertexts not being a shuffle.
Simulated common reference string:
The simulator S 1 runs the common reference string generation protocol. It sets τ := (τ trapdoor , x 1 , . . . , x n ) and outputs (σ, τ ).
Simulator's input: The simulator S 2 receives the shuffle statement and (σ, τ ).
Simulated proof:
Create a trapdoor commitment with double opening to φ = 0 and φ = 1. Compute
Set the remaining variables to 1 and create a perfect witness indistinguishable GS proof ψ that there exists an exponent φ ∈ Z p and group elements {a i },
w that satisfy the required equations. Size of the NIZK argument. To commit to φ = 1 we can use trivial randomness, so the commitment to φ does not have to be included in the proof -the verifier can compute it himself. There are 2n + 10 variables in G and it takes 3 group elements for each commitment, so the commitments contribute a total of 6n + 30 group elements towards the proof size. The first 6 equalities cost 9 group elements each for a total of 54 group elements. The next two multiexponentiation equations cost 9 group elements each for a total of 18 group elements. We then have n pairing product equations of the form e(a i , a i ) = e(g, b i ) which cost a total of 9n group elements. Finally, we have 6 pairing product equations, where one side of the pairings is publicly known and one side is committed. They each cost 3 group elements for a total of 18 group elements.
The total size of the proof is 15n + 120 group elements. The size of the common reference string is 2n + 8 group elements. 1 We observe that the cost of shuffling multiple sets of ciphertexts with the same permutation may be amortized to a constant number of group elements. The first set of ciphertexts costs 15n+120 group elements. But we only need to commit to a i , b i and prove e(a i , a i ) = e(g, b i ) once. Regardless of n, the subsequent shuffles under the same permutation only cost 120 group elements each.
Remark on Shuffling BGN Ciphertexts
Another homomorphic cryptosystem over bilinear groups was introduced by Boneh, Goh and Nissim [BGN05] . This cryptosystem is based on the Subgroup Decision Assumption over composite order bilinear groups. The ciphertexts consist of one group element each, so with n input ciphertexts and n outputs ciphertexts, the shuffle statement contains 2n group elements and another group elements to describe the public key. The techniques we have presented in this paper can also be used to shuffle BGN ciphertexts. Assuming the Subgroup Decision Assumption holds and assuming suitable variants of the Permutation Pairing and the Simultaneous Pairing Assumptions hold, we can make an NIZK argument for correctness of a shuffle consisting of 3n + O(1) group elements. Since the Subgroup Decision Assumption only holds when factoring the group order is hard, the group elements in this scheme are quite large though.
While this scheme may have applications, we note that there is one subtle issue that one must be careful about. The GS proofs can be instantiated with bilinear groups of composite order where the Subgroup Decision Problem is hard, but they are only secure if the factorization of the composite group is unknown. The decryption key for the cryptosystem is the factorization of the group order. The R co -soundness of the scheme therefore only holds as long as the adversary does not know the decryption key for the cryptosystem. The NIZK argument is therefore not R co -sound as defined in this paper, albeit it will satisfy a suitably weakened R co -soundness definition.
